MATCH Act targets chip tool exports to China

A bipartisan US bill aimed at tightening semiconductor export controls on China is making progress through the House Foreign Affairs Committee, with lawmakers looking to enhance the restrictions by enshrining them in law rather than relying solely on the discretion of the Commerce Department’s Bureau of Industry and Security.

The proposal, known as the MATCH Act, is presented by its sponsors as a means to address loopholes in current semiconductor export controls and to encourage allied supplier countries to align more closely with the United States. In practical terms, the original House bill would have established stricter controls on chipmaking equipment and related services, making it more challenging to relax regulations compared to the current rulemaking approach of the BIS.

The significance of the bill lies in the fact that the existing US regulatory framework is predominantly administrative, allowing for rules to be adjusted, softened, or reinterpreted by the executive branch. Supporters of the MATCH Act advocate for a greater portion of this framework to be codified in law, particularly concerning critical semiconductor manufacturing equipment and Chinese facilities essential for advanced-node production.

However, there is a notable development to consider. The initial text introduced in early April was more direct and forceful than the substitute text now presented for committee markup. The earlier version specifically named Chinese entities such as SMIC, YMTC, CXMT, Huawei, and Hua Hong, and outlined a swifter process for allied alignment and potential unilateral US measures if alignment efforts faltered.

The substitute text takes a broader and more procedural approach. Instead of specifying a fixed list of companies and tool classes in the legislation, it instructs US agencies to identify “key chokepoint semiconductor manufacturing equipment” and “key semiconductor manufacturing facilities,” engage with industry stakeholders confidentially, report findings to Congress, and then implement controls over a longer period. Additionally, it includes an exemption for facilities existing at the time of enactment that are owned and operated by companies headquartered outside of countries of concern, a provision that could be significant for non-Chinese fabs operating in China.

Industry influence is a notable aspect of the bill. Micron, as reported by Reuters, has been actively lobbying in favor of stricter restrictions, asserting that the US should take more decisive action to impede the growth of Chinese memory manufacturers. This injects a commercial dimension into the MATCH Act alongside its geopolitical implications, particularly as the legislation would intensify pressure on foreign suppliers like ASML if allied nations do not fully align with US controls.

As previously covered by eeNews Europe during the US’s tightening of export controls on lithography, etch, and HBM memory, Washington has been expanding its semiconductor restrictions. The current move is less about introducing entirely new policies and more about solidifying existing measures to prevent easy reversal. The substitute text filed for committee markup is the key document shaping the current version under consideration.